

# Phase Transitions and Universality: A Case Study in Democratic Instability

Alexander F. Siegenfeld


ELLIIT Focus Period  
2 October 2023



# What does physics have to do with social systems?

## Universality and the renormalization group

- Impossible to capture all details
- Can't even model individual person
- Model must fall into the same universality class as system
- Phase transitions between universality classes



# Outline

- General approach
  - Need for theory
    - Example: why the West got masks wrong
  - The space of possibilities (choosing the right variables/description)
    - Example: travel restrictions in pandemic response
  - Multiscale analysis
    - Example: complexity profiles
- Negative representation and instability in democratic elections
  - Extension to federal democracies (if time)

# The need for theory: avoiding naive empiricism

Without explicit theory, default assumptions of independence and homogeneity tend to be implicitly smuggled in



Vox @voxdotcom

While more than 100 people have died in the #coronavirus outbreak, seasonal flu kills between 250,000-650,000 people annually.

For most people, "you're probably more likely to be catching flu than you are to be getting coronavirus," says @devisridhar.



These 2 questions will determine if the coronavirus becomes a deadly pandemic. We still don't have firm answers to the most important questions about this virus. [voxdot.com](#)

9:58 AM · Feb 1, 2020 · SocialFlow



Vox @voxdotcom

A travel ban isn't likely to prevent the spread of #coronavirus. Here's why.



The evidence on travel bans for diseases like coronavirus is clear: They don't work. They're political theater, not good public health policy. [voxdot.com](#)

6:00 PM · Feb 3, 2020 · SocialFlow



Vox @voxdotcom

The coronavirus exposes the history of racism and "cleanliness"



The coronavirus exposes the history of racism and "cleanliness" While the epidemic may be new, xenophobia has been intertwined with public health discourse for a very long time. [voxdot.com](#)

7:40 AM · Feb 7, 2020 · Vox Media



Vox @voxdotcom

10:20 AM · Mar 2, 2020 · Twitter Web App

2/ Oh, and face masks? You can pass on them.

Masks are only useful if you have a respiratory infection already and want to limit the risk of spreading, or if you're working in a hospital in direct contact with people who have respiratory illnesses. [bit.ly/2PzvrSI](#)

**You do not need a mask to avoid coronavirus.**

Masks are only useful if you already have a respiratory infection and want



Vox @voxdotcom · 2/1/20

What is this #coronavirus? It's part of a family of viruses that attack the respiratory system.

Should I travel during the outbreak? The CDC and the State Department advise avoiding travel to China for now.

Is this going to be a deadly pandemic? No.




9 questions about the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic, answered [VOX.COM](#)



Vox @voxdotcom


"No handshakes, please": The tech industry is terrified of the coronavirus



"No handshakes, please": The tech industry is terrified of the coronavirus Although public officials in the area say the virus is contained for now, some in the tech industry fear the virus will spread out of control. [voxdot.com](#)

7:00 AM · Feb 13, 2020 · Vox Media

# The need for theory: avoiding naive empiricism



Pratyush K. Kallepara, Alexander F. Siegenfeld, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Yaneer Bar-Yam. Unmasking the mask studies: why the effectiveness of surgical masks in preventing respiratory infections has been underestimated. [Journal of Travel Medicine](#) **28**, taab144 (2021)



# The space of possibilities: choosing the right variables

- Hidden assumption in the variables chosen
  - Describing disease by average number of cases per population
    - Rules out travel restrictions from the outset
  - Social contact rate constant in time
    - Rules out non-pharmaceutical interventions

Alexander F. Siegenfeld, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Yaneer Bar-Yam. What models can and cannot tell us about COVID-19. [PNAS 117, 16092-16095](#) (2020).

Alexander F. Siegenfeld and Yaneer Bar-Yam. The impact of travel and timing in eliminating COVID-19. [Communications Physics 3, 204](#) (2020).


# Multiscale analysis: complexity profiles




Alexander F. Siegenfeld and Yaneer Bar-Yam. An introduction to complex systems science and its applications. [Complexity 6105872](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-9829-7) (2020).






# Examples




Factory (efficiency vs adaptability)



Military conflict





# Negative representation and instability in democratic elections



Alexander F. Siegenfeld and Yaneeer Bar-Yam. Negative representation and instability in democratic elections. [Nature Physics 16, 186-190](#) (2020)


# Conceptual overview

- Goal: characterize and understand electoral instability




# Conceptual overview

- Goal: characterize and understand electoral instability
- Election
  - Input: electorate opinions
  - Output: opinion of elected official



# Conceptual overview

- Goal: characterize and understand electoral instability
- Election
  - Input: electorate opinions
  - Output: opinion of elected official
- Key Results
  - All unstable elections contain *negatively represented* opinions
  - Phase transition between stable and unstable regime



Negative representation

# General model





- Opinion  $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$  describes *entire* set of political beliefs
- Electorate opinions:  $\{x_1, \dots, x_N\}$
- Election outcome:  $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$
- Election: a mapping from  $(\mathbb{R}^d)^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$
- Representation (in 1D):  $r_i^c \equiv \frac{\delta y}{c}$  for  $x_i \rightarrow x_i + c$ 
  - If the derivative exists:  $r_i \equiv \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_i}$
- Instability: election discontinuous
- Translational invariance:  $y(x_1 + c, \dots, x_N + c) = y(x_1, \dots, x_N) + c$

# All unstable elections contain negatively represented opinions

- Instability implies  $\delta y_1 \equiv y(x_1, \dots, x_i + \epsilon, \dots, x_N) - y(x_1, \dots, x_N) \equiv C$  with  $|C| > |\epsilon|$
- Trans. symmetry:  $\delta y_2 \equiv y(x_1 - \epsilon, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_N - \epsilon) - y(x_1, \dots, x_N) = C - \epsilon$
- $\delta y_1 \delta y_2 > 0 \rightarrow$  exists negatively represented opinion

# Distributions of opinions

- Consider distribution of opinions  $f(x) \approx \sum_{i=1}^N \delta(x - x_i)$







# Distributions of opinions

- Consider distribution of opinions  $f(x) \approx \sum_{i=1}^N \delta(x - x_i)$
- Election:  $f \rightarrow y[f]$
- In the limit where any one voter has a small effect on the outcome:
  - Representation (in 1D):  $r(f, x) = \frac{d}{dx} \frac{\delta y}{\delta f(x)}$
  - $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} dx f(x) r(f, x) = 1$

# Application to utility difference models


- Preferences of citizen with opinion  $x$ :  $p_{y_1} - p_{y_2} = u_x(y_1) - u_x(y_2)$
- Outcome:  $\operatorname{argmax}_{y \in \mathbb{R}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} dx f(x) u_x(y)$
- Can reproduce outcome of median voter theorem:  $u_x(y) = -|y - x|$
- Mean voting:  $u_x(y) = -(y - x)^2$
- Alienation:  $u_x(y) = e^{-\frac{(y-x)^2}{2a^2}}$ 
  - Reduces to mean voting as  $a \rightarrow \infty$



# Representation

- $r(f, x) = \frac{d}{dx} \frac{\delta y}{\delta f(x)} \propto -\frac{1}{N} u''(y - x)$
- Negative representation unless concave utility
- Median voting:  $u_x(y) = -|y - x|$
- Mean voting:  $u_x(y) = -(y - x)^2$
- Alienation:  $u_x(y) = e^{-\frac{(y-x)^2}{2a^2}}$


**Note:**  
**instability** → **negative**  
**representation**  
**(but not vice versa)**



# Polarizing electorate

## Democrats and Republicans More Ideologically Divided than in the Past

*Distribution of Democrats and Republicans on a 10-item scale of political values*



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public


Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). The blue area in this chart represents the ideological distribution of Democrats; the red area of Republicans. The overlap of these two distributions is shaded purple. Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


# Phase transition

Polarizing  
electorate:


**A**  $f(x)$  for  $J=0.25$



**B**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1$ .



**C**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1.75$



$$f(x) = w_1 e^{-\frac{(x+\Delta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} + w_2 e^{-\frac{(x-\Delta)^2}{2\sigma^2}}$$


Dimensionless measure of polarization  $J = \frac{\Delta^2}{a^2 + \sigma^2}$

$$h = \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{w_2}{w_1}$$


Recall:  $u_x(y) = e^{-\frac{(y-x)^2}{2a^2}}$

# Phase transition


**A**  $f(x)$  for  $J=0.25$



**B**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1$ .




**C**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1.75$



Polarizing  
electorate:

$y(h=0, J)$


Election outcome  
for symmetric  
electorate:




$$y/\Delta = \tanh(Jy/\Delta + h)$$

# Phase transition


**A**  $f(x)$  for  $J=0.25$



**B**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1.$




**C**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1.75$




Polarizing  
electorate:

$y(h=0, J)$


Election outcome  
for symmetric  
electorate:




**E**  $y(h, J=0.25)$



**F**  $y(h, J=1.)$



**G**  $y(h, J=1.75)$




Election outcomes  
as function of the  
relative sizes of the  
two peaks:

$$h = \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{w_2}{w_1}$$


$$y/\Delta = \tanh(Jy/\Delta + h)$$

# Phase transition


**A**  $f(x)$  for  $J=0.25$



**B**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1.$




**C**  $f(x)$  for  $J=1.75$




Polarizing electorate:

$y(h=0, J)$


Election outcome for symmetric electorate:




**E**  $y(h, J=0.25)$



**F**  $y(h, J=1.)$



**G**  $y(h, J=1.75)$




Election outcomes as function of the relative sizes of the two peaks:

In unstable regime, majority of losing subpopulation is negatively represented.




# Median voter theorem vs. alienation




# Universality


$f(x)$  for  $J=0.25$




$f(x)$  for  $J=1.$



$f(x)$  for  $J=1.75$



$y(h=0, J)$



Overlaid:  
ideology of  
party platforms  
(Jordan et al.)


$y(h, J=0.25)$



$y(h, J=1.)$



$y(h, J=1.75)$




# Conclusions

- Two regimes for elections: stable and unstable
  - Unstable regime contains negatively represented opinions
- Causes of instability
  - Polarization
  - Low voter turnout
  - Party primary system

$$\text{Var}(z) = \mathbb{E}(\text{Var}(z | W_1)) + \mathbb{E}(\text{Var}(\mathbb{E}(z | W_1) | W_2)) + \dots + \mathbb{E}(\text{Var}(\mathbb{E}(z | W_{N-1}) | W_N)) + \text{Var}(\mathbb{E}(z | W_N)).$$

# Epilogue: federal democracies



- Three pillars (institutions, policy environment, electorate)
- Social ties
- Election axes and salience

# 2016 presidential two-party vote shares by precinct

